Evolution of Coalition Structures under Uncertainty
Abstract
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In this paper we introduce and investigate some evolutionary games arising from the γ and the δ static models of coalition formation defined in Hart and Kurz (1983). In particular, we assume that players determine at every instant their strategies and we study how the coalition structure might evolve accordingly. Finally, we focus on minimal change revisions of coalition structure probabilistic beliefs and provide existence results.
In this paper we introduce and investigate some evolutionary games arising from the γ and the δ static models of coalition formation defined in Hart and Kurz (1983). In particular, we assume that players determine at every instant their strategies and we study how the coalition structure might evolve accordingly. Finally, we focus on minimal change revisions of coalition structure probabilistic beliefs and provide existence results.
DOI Code:
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Keywords:
coalition formation; coherent beliefs; differential inclusions; viability theory; minimal change belief revision
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