Equilibria in Social Networks with Heterogeneous Agents
Abstract
En
Empirical literature shows that ex-ante asymmetries across players arise quite naturally in social network formation. In this work, a very general kind of heterogeneity is considered, and two different models of network formation are introduced corresponding to different kind of disutility of establishing direct connections. These models are games with vector valued payoffs which are here investigated by using the concept of Pareto-Nash equilibrium and its refinements.
Empirical literature shows that ex-ante asymmetries across players arise quite naturally in social network formation. In this work, a very general kind of heterogeneity is considered, and two different models of network formation are introduced corresponding to different kind of disutility of establishing direct connections. These models are games with vector valued payoffs which are here investigated by using the concept of Pareto-Nash equilibrium and its refinements.
DOI Code:
�
Keywords:
social network formation; one sided networks; heterogeneity; multicriteria games; Pareto Nash equilibrium; refinements
Full Text: PDF
